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The Right to Bear Arms and Handgun Prohibition:
A Fundamental Rights Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
In the struggle between the historic police powers and the individual
liberties secured by the federal Constitution. few recent controversies
have been more bitterly contested than those regarding the regulation
of firearms. The second amendment provides a deceptively clear guar-
antee that "'the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed." Yet the legislatures are imposing restrictions which cut
deeper into the exercise of that "right" than ever before' moving from
regulation to outright prohibition. In determining what, if any. consti-
tutional limits exist on the legislature's ability to regulate arms, the
courts face an exceptionally difficult task. for neither history nor prece-
dent provides a clear guide.
It is the scope of this article to examine whether the right to keep and
bear arms may be accorded the status of a "fundamental right." and
what effect such a status would have on judicial scrutiny of legislative
attempts to prohibit the private ownership of handguns.' In so doing.
three points are worth noting at the outset.
First. attempts to regulate firearms in the United States to date have
been quite modest. A result of this has been a paucity of case law ad-
dressed directly to the nature of the "right to bear arms." The most far-
reaching action taken by Congress thus far has been the Omnibus
Crime Control Acts of 1968 and 1970, which were designed primarily
to regulate firearms dealers and to provide for the registration of un-
I See inj?.a note 6.
2 Under a pure fundamental rights anal,%is. the United States Supreme Court has gi,.cn
heightened pretcction from lcgislatisc interference to certain rights. re gardlcss of their pre~cnce or
lack of mention in the Bill of Rights S'e. eg . Ilarpcr v. Virgtnia Board of clction,. 383 U S.
6b3 1966) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U S. 618 1969) uright to interstate travel)
This analsis must be distinguished from that used to determine ihich of those rights enumerated
in the first eight amendments are to be "incorporated" against the state% See. e g . Adamson v.
California. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The imponancc of this distinction is that an attempt to "incorpo-
rate" the second amendment against the state. would be restricted by the narrow historical cir-
cumbtanccs that underlie the creation and meaning of that amendment
3. It should be noted that several state constitutions grant the right to bear arms, and that
there rights may well confer protection broader than that of the second amendment Inicrpreta-
tion of state constitutional rights to bear arms figured prominently in the opinions in Carson v
State. 241 Ga. 622. 247 S.E.2d 68 (1978) and Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove. 532 F Supp.
1169 (N D. I1. 1981). aff'd 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir 1982). cert. dented. 104 S. Ct 194 (19X3). InJra
note 6
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usually dangerous weapons such as machine guns.4 Neither Act pro-
hibits the licensed possession of an;' weapon.' At present. only two
cases have reached the merits of an unqualified prohibition of
handguns.
6
Second, although the recent trend in handgun regulation has pro-
voked a steady stream of legal discussion, most of it has focused on the
right to bear arms generally. The question which remains unanswered
is how much protection a recognized "right to bear arms" will lend to
the handgun specifically. In Part IV of this article, this subject is ad-
dressed by suggesting a model justification for restricting a fundamen-
tal right to bear arms, based on an analogy to first amendment
jurisprudence.
Third, handgun control is an issue which has made for strange
bedfellows in both the judicial and political arenas. It has placed the
normally conservative pro-states-rights elements of the political right in
the position of advocating an expansive concept of personal liberties.
Attorneys for the National Rifle Association have gone so far as to in-
voke the *'penumbra of unwritten rights surrounding the first, second.
third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments" which serve to make rights
"incapable of surrender" to the legislature.' Conversely, the liberal ele-
ments in favor of gun control have taken an uncharacteristic stand in
favor of the historic police powers. For example. the architect of the
"penumbral" theory, and perhaps the Supreme Court's greatest cham-
pion of individual liberties, has had this to say on the subject:
There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing
the purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no
reason why pistols may not be barred from anyone with a police record.
4 IS U S §§ 921-928( 1976): 26 d. §§ 5801-5872 (Supp. V 19811.
5 The pro.sions of 26 U S C § 5811 (1976) require a S26( transr'er tax to he paid upon the
sale of any -firearm." The definition of "firearm" offered in Section 5845 exclude. conventional
rifles. shotguns and handguns, but specifically includes such items as silencers, rockets, machine
guns and grenade.. These latter items are available for private ownership upon proper registra-
tion and payment of the tax The accompanying regulations of the Bureau of Alcohol. Firearms
and Tobacco are set out in 27 C.F.R. § 179 (1981).
6 The Georgia Supreme Court struck down a state law forbidding easily concealable
"'breast pistols" in Nunn v. State. I Ga. 243 (1846). on the grounds that a categorical prohibition
of any class of arms violates the right to bear arms under the federal Constitution. Ilowever. in
Carson. 241 Ga. 622. 247 S.E.2d 68 (upholding ban on unlicensed sawed-off shotguns). the court
held that the right to bear arms as granted by the Georgia Constitution is not infringed so long as
some weapon remains available to the citizen.
More recently, a city-wide ban.on handguns was upheld against challenges under the United
States and Illinois Constitutions in Qutdici. A majority of the three-judge panel affirmed the trial
court. over a strong dissent, while noting that the "'vital importance" of the issue made the trial
court's refusal to abstain as "'appropriate in this case las) in cases where fundamental rights arc
involved."
7. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 97th Cong. 2d Sess.. Repor on the Right to Keep and
Bear.4rm.r. 95 (Comm. Print 1982) (Featherstone. General Counsel for the N.R.A.) (hereinafter
cited as Senate Committee Report).
2
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There is no reason why a State may not require a purchaser of a pistol
to pass a psychiatric test. There is no reason why all pistols should not
be barred to everyone except the police."
11. THE POLICE POWER
Where the acts of a legislature do not impinge on "fundamental
rights," or draw lines based on "suspect classifications," the courts exer-
cise a minimal degree of scrutiny in determining whether there has
been an improper use of the police powers.' This minimal scrutiny
requires that the law, in order to satisfy due process, "not be unreason-
able, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained."," A
state law is to be presumed valid unless "it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within
the knowledge and experience of the legislators."' I
Viewed in this light, a law which seeks to ban handguns in an at-
tempt to reduce the toll of death through accident and homicide seems
eminently defensible. The ease with which a handgun may be con-
cealed makes it an ideal choice for the criminal seeking to elude detec-
tion. In addition, dozens of empirical studies, based primarily on FBI
statistics, have underscored the growing contribution the handgun is
making to crime and injury. Between the years 1960 and 1973. for ex-
ample, the proportion of serious assaults involving handguns rose from
12.7 per cent to 29 per cent of all assaults.' 2 Between 1966 and 1973.
the percentage of homicides committed with handguns rose from 37
per cent to 52 per cent.'3 In addition, it should be noted that although
handguns account for an estimated 20-25 per cent of all firearms in the
United States, they account for 90 per cent of all firearm-related deaths
and accidents. 4
In the popular war over handgun control, statistics have been the
principal weapon for both sides. Yet what role do these often contra-
8. Adams v. Williams. 407 US. 14;. 150 (1972) (disscnting opinion of Douglas. J..joncd by
Marshall. J.).
9. See generafly Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evol ing Doctrine on a Changing Court. .4
Modelfor a Newer Protection. 86 HARv. L. RLv. 1 (1972).
10 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502. 525 (1934).
II. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 U.S. 144. 152 (1938). In a footnote to this
sentence. the celebrated footnote 4. the Court alluded to a **narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohi-
bition of the Constitution." Id at n.4.
12. Fields. landgun Prohibition and Social Necessity. 23 ST. Louis L.J. 35. 37 11979). Phil-
lips. 11andguns and lhomicide: Minimizing Losses and the Costs of Control. 5 J. Li.(;AL SliJ. 464.
468 (1976)
13 Zimring. Ftrearmsand Federal Law- The Gun Control.4 c of 168. 4 J. Li.(,A STUD. 133.
171-72 (1975).
14 See Fields. supra note 12.
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dictory statistics have to play in constitutional adjudication? The obvi-
ous answer is that they supply the "rational basis" necessary for the
legislature's judgment to survive due process scrutiny. However, statis-
tics are not a two-way street; it is highly unlikely that a handgun prohi-
bition can be defeated in the courts by a statistical showing that the
handgun is not directly related to the problem. As Justice Holmes
warned in his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, "the Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."-'
The minimum rationality test requires that legislation have some ra-
tional basis, not that it be the only rational choice. Invalidation of anti-
handgun laws must therefore occur on a level of scrutiny higher than
this and must draw on sources other than social studies.
I11. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS AS A "FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT"
A. "Fundamental Rights" Analsis
Under the substantive due process approach developed by the
United States Supreme Court, legislation which alfects rights deemed
to be "fundamental" is subjected to a much more demanding judicial
scrutiny than the traditional "rationality" test of Nebbia v. New York . "
The enhanced protection owing to a particular "fundamental right" is
not dependent on a specific constitutional guarantee, but is rather a
function of the fourteenth amendment's requirement that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." As Justice Harlan wrote in Poe v. U//man,
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guar-
antees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech. press, and religion: the right to keep and bear
arms: the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.
• ..and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judg-
ment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment."1
15. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45. 75 (1904) (Holmes. J.. dissenting). In QwU/r.'. 532 F.
Supp. 1169. the seventh circuit found a handgun ban to be neither "wholly arbitrary nor com-
pletely unsupported by any state of facts. Accordingly. we decline to consider plaintiffs argu-
ments that Ordinance No. 81-11 will not make Morton Grove a safer, more peaceful place."
16. Seesupra text accompanying note 10.
17. Poe v. UlIman. 367 U.S. 497. 542-43 (1960) (dissenting opinion). More recently. Justice
Powell pointed to the Poe dissent as one which "most accurately reflects the thrust of our prior
decisions" and "expressly points to history and tradition as the source for supplying content to
Isubstantive due processl." Moore v. East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494. 504 n.12 (1977) (Powell. J..
plurality opinion).
4
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In order to implicate the right to bear arms as a fundamental right.
the sources the courts must draw from include the history and tradi-
tions of the American people. as well as judicial decisions. The Court
has recognized that the due process clause protects basic rights -im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' 8 rights whose contours are to
be shaped by the court "by continual insistence upon respect for the
teachings of history. land] solid recognition of the basic values that un-
derlie our society.''
Application of the fundamental fights analysis to the right to bear
arms, then, is not dependent upon the scope or nature of any rights
guaranteed by the second amendment. In fact. as discussed below, this
amendment has been construed as not granting an individual right at
all. Rather. the relevance of the second amendment lies in its value as
evidence of the important role played by private ownership of firearms
in the traditions of our country and in the thought of the Founders.
The question of whether the right to bear arms is fundamental is to be
answered outside the language of the Constitution itseltf
B. The Second Amendmnent." Histor;" and Policies
The second amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"A well-regulated Militia. being necessary to the security of a free
State. the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed." The origins and policies of the second amendment sprang
from a military and political milieu which has changed radically in the
intervening two centuries. Organized military power came in three
forms at the time of the Framers: the standing army. the "select" mili-
tia. and the sedentary militia. A standing army of 1776 was no differ-
ent from its modern counterparts, an organization of professional.
fulltime soldiers equipped and paid by the government. The sclect ni-
litia corresponds closely with our modern National Guard. being com-
prised of a select group of individuals who spend a limited time each
year in training. The rest of the year these "citizen-soldiers" are em-
ployed in civilian pursuits and remain on call for duty. The sedentary
militia was different in that it consisted of all able-bodied men, who
were expected to provide their own weapons, and to serve in case of an
emergency.
It was the purpose of the second amendment to protect from federal
infringement the right of the several states to maintain their own seden-
tary militias. The Founding Fathers' fear and distrust of a federal
standing army is well-documented. In 1774 the Continental Congress
declared that maintaining a "standing army in these colonies, in time of
18. Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319. 325 (1937).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479. 501 (1964) (liarlan. J.. concurring).
5
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peace. without the consent of the legislature of that colony, in which
such army is kept, is against law. 1 20 Similarly, in 1776 Samuel Adams
wrote to James Warren that "a standing army. however necessary it
may be at some times, is always dangerous to the liberties of the
people."2'
This fear of standing armies, whether foreign or domestic, was a na-
tional reaction to the colonists' experience with the British. The states
feared that an army under the control of the federal government would
threaten the political independence of the States. 22 In this respect, the
Framers saw no distinction between a standing army and a select mili-
tia. as both were equally capable of allowing a small segment of the
population to impose its will on the majority. Thus was Baron von
Steuben's proposal for a dual select and sedentary militia system
roundly defeated by the Continental Congress. 23
The solution favored was that put forward by Richard Henry Lee:
"[The Constitution ought to secure a genuine, and guard against a se-
lect militia, by providing that the militia shall always be kept well or-
ganized. armed and disciplined, and include, according to the past and
general usage of the states, all men capable of bearing arms ... ."
This proposal was incorporated directly into the Constitution as the
second amendment. It was. in a sense, a dual compromise-first. a
compromise between the need to provide national security and the fear
of tyranny by the government, and second, a compromise between the
military power of the states and that of the Federal government.--'
At the same time, several of the States were writing into their own
constitutions identical provisions barring the establishment of standing
armies and placing military power in the hands of the sedentary militia.
Typical of these was Maryland, which resolved:
XXV. That a well-regulated militia is the natural and proper defense
of a free government.
XXVI. That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not
to be raised or kept up. without the consent of the
Legislature.2'6
Two points are noteworthy with respect to the sedentary militia. The
20. R PI RkY & J. COOPER. SOUR( US O OUR LI8rRTII.S 288 (1959).
21. . JIN. Til-. NEw NTION: A HISTORY f1 Till; UNITED STATI-S DIsIN Till. (O-
1I-.I)ERAII0)N 29 (1962).
22. Levin. The Right to Bear 4rms." The De 'elopment ofthe American Etpeirience. 4X Ci.-
KENT L. REv.. 148. 151 (1971).
23. Senale Committee Repon. spra note 7. at 57-59 (Hardy).
24. LETTiERS FROM TIlE FEDERAL F'RA'IER TO TIlE REpIBLICAN 21 (W. Benneit ed. 1978)
25. The catalyst for the rear of the States for iheir own sovereignty was the adoption of
Article I. Section 8 of the Constitution. giving Congress the power to "raise and support Arm.ic.s."
Levin. jpra note 22. at 156.
26. Id at 152.
6
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first is that the weapons were not provided by the government but by
the citizens themselves. As the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized in United States v. Miller,27 it was common for the states to re-
quire, upon criminal penalty, each citizen to maintain his own rifle and
supplies. This was a practical system in 1776, when ammunition was
not standardized and the same powder, flint and lead would satisfy the
needs of almost any particular weapon. Second. the men of the seden-
tary militia were expected to devote a certain amount of time each year
in training and drill. The concept of the militia as an inchoate mass.
not subject to state regulation and taking shape only in time of war. is
historically incorrect.28
From the foregoing discussion, the contours of the second amend-
ment's guarantee of the "right to keep and bear arms" are clear. The
second amendment, like the first amendment, may be said to have a
"core content" of a political nature. 2' It was designed to secure a meas-
ure of individual liberty, and state independence, by fostering a specific
type of military organization, the sedentary militia. Due to the peculiar
nature of this long-outdated organization, the guarantee fashioned by
the second amendment necessarilyI sought to protect its basic character-
istics-that it be well-regulated, 3 that its weapons be supplied by the
citizens themselves, and that its scope encompass all those subject to
serve, namely, the "whole body of the people."
The role of firearms in the political thought of the Framers has its
roots far deeper than the second amendment, which may be said to be
merely illustrative of that role. The prevailing view at the time the
Constitution was written was that the individual's right to arm himself
was an indispensable element of free democracy, a view shaped by the
early English experience.
It had been the practice of the seventeenth century English monarchs
to consolidate their political power through laws disarming the popu-
lace and religious opposition in particular. Charles II. in 1670. enacted
laws prohibiting the possession of "Guns, Bows or other Engines."
James I1. shortly thereafter, embarked on an extensive program to dis-
27 307 U.S. 174. 179 (1939).
2M See United States v. Warin. 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976). in which a criminal dcfcndant'
contention that his standing in the sedentary militia gave him the right to own an unlicensed
machine gun was summarily dismissed.
29. See MEIKLEJOHIN. FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION '0 SELF GOVERNMI NT (1948).
which sets out the theory that the protection afforded by the first amendment guarantee of free-
dom of speech can be determined with reference to the "core" purpose of that guarantee-to
promote the exchange of political ideas.
30. In An. I. § 8 of the United States Constitution. it is interesting to note that the Federal
government retained for itself the power to regulate the militias. In that section. the states are
given the "Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
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arm his Protestant rivals while arming the Catholics.3 ' Blackstone rec-
ognized the purpose of these acts to be "the prevention of popular
insurrection and resistence to the government by disarming the bulk of
the people." 2 Against this background, the English Bill of Rights of
1689 was adopted to give all Englishmen "the right of having and using
arms for self preservation and defense.13 3 It was to this Bill of Rights
that the American Framers looked when drafting the Constitution. 4
From this experience, the value placed on an armed populace may
perhaps best be described as a general "deterrent value." This value is
reflected strongly in the political writings of the various Framers, both
Federalist and anti-Federalist. Richard Henry Lee, arguing for the
adoption of the American Bill of Rights, wrote that "to preserve liberty,
it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms.' 35
Similarly, Noah Webster wrote that:
Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed: as they
are in almost every kingdom of Europe. The supreme power in
America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole
body of the people are armed and constitute a force superior to any
bank of regular troops that can be. on any pretense. raised in the
United States. " 36
To this end, Samuel Adams proposed to the Massachusetts Conven-
tion of 1788 an amendment that the "Constitution be never construed
to authorize Congress to prevent the people of the United States, who
are peaceable citizens from keeping their own arms."3 Patrick Henry
urged that "the great object is that every man be armed . . . Every-
one who is able may have a gun"38
It seems unquestionable that the Framers would have provided an
affirmative answer to the question whether arms are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.139 Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No.
46, noted that
Americans possess ["the advantage of being armed"] over the people of
almost every other nation. The existence of subordinate governments
to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are
appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more
insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can
31. 1lalbrook. The Jurirprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 G.M.U. L.
Ri-.v , 7-9 (1981).
32 I W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 412 (1766).
33. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject. I William and Mary, st. 2 ch. 2
(1689).
34. Senate Committee Report. upra note 7. at 51 (Hardy).
35. Letters. supra note 24. at 170.
36. Senate Committee Report., supra note 7. at 56 (Hardy).
37 Id at 89 (Featherstone).
38. 3 J. ELLIOT. DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 386 (2d ed. 1836).
39. Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. at 325.
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admit of." )
Yet it is questionable whether even this general philosophy, that an
armed populace deters tyranny, would grant the right to bear arms
outside the context of the organized militia. It remains problematical
whether they would attach the same value to arms in a world where.
due to the increasing cost, sophistication and destructive potential of
modem weapons, the militia is no longer a feasible concept.
C. The Judicial Response
As might be expected from the foregoing, the courts have given a
narrow construction to the guarantees of the second amendment and
the right to bear arms in general. The amendment has been generally
construed as granting a collective right in the several states for the pur-
poses of maintaining their militias, rather than an individual right to
keep and bear arms. Similarly, it is considered solely a restriction on
Congress and not the States. There does seem to be an early recogni-
tion of the right as one which is "'fundamental" and thus not dependent
upon any specific Constitutional guarantee for protection. However,
courts from common law times to the present have always tolerated
significant restrictions on the exercise of this fight.
1. The Federal Courts
The United States Supreme Court has never dealt with the second
amendment in a comprehensive fashion, although the issue has been
treated in a few older cases. In United States '. Cruikshan/A-,4 the Court
reversed the conviction of several whites for conspiring to deprive
blacks of their constitutional rights. The rights alleged to have been
deprived included the right of assembly and the right to bear arms.
The Court stated that the right to bear arms, like the right to assemble,
was "not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is if in anj'inanner
dependent on that instrunentfor its eristence.'42 This latter quote indi-
cates that the Court was aware of a fundamental right to bear arms,
linking it with the right of assembly and speech as deriving its "source
from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized man
40. Tim FEDERALIST No. 46. at 8 (J. Madison).
41. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
42. Id. at 553 (emphasis added). Cruikshank is often cited for the proposition that the second
amendment restricts only Congress and thus does not -'apply- to the States. However, this case
was decided under the theory of the fourteenth amendment set forth in the Slaughterhouse Cases.
83 U.S (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). That theory. which suppors the proposition that the fourteenth
amendment protects only -incidents of national citizenship." has long been discarded in favor of
the incorporation approach of Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319.
9
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throughout the world."4
In Presser v. Illinois," the Court upheld the convictions of several
private'citizens for violating a State law which forbade the parading of
armed military organizations without a license from the governor.
There the second amendment was held to be a limitation only upon the
power of Congress and not of the states.4" However, the Court warned
that "the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in
question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing
arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for
maintaining the public security."'
The most recent decision from the United States Supreme Court
came in 1939 with United States v. Miller." Miller had been indicted
for violating the Federal Firearms Act of 1934, which requires a $200
transfer tax to be paid prior to the interstate transportation of certain
weapons, such as Miller's sawed-off shotgun. The district court sus-
tained a demurrer to the indictment on the grounds that the Act vio-
lated the second amendment; the Supreme Court reversed.
The Miller opinion provides uncertain guidance, containing little le-
gal reasoning, a great deal of interesting but largely irrelevant history
on the militia system, and no discussion of Cruiktshank or Presser. The
Court dismissed defendant's claim by stating:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use
of a 'shot-gun having a barrell of less than eighteen inches in length' at
this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or effi-
ciency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of
the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense.48
Anti-gun-control writers have seized upon this passage as a "'test" for
second amendment protection, or at least an invitation to submit proof
on the issue of a weapon's "reasonable relationship" to a militia."
However. the courts have treated it as a rhetorical flourish rather than
an attempt to formulate any kind of test.'"
The lower federal courts have been uniform in their treatment of the
43. 92 U.S. at 551 (quoting Marshall. C.J.. in Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I. 211
q1824)).
44. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
45. Id at 265.
46. Id
47. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
48. Id at 178.
49. Senate Committee Report. supra note 7. at 92 (Featherstone).
50 See Cases v. United States. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942). cert. den. rubnoln., Velasquez v.
United States. 319 U.S. 770 (1943): United States v. Warin. 530 F.2d at 106.
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right to bear arms, dealing only with the second amendment in the con-
text of the Miller decision. Two main points have been stressed in
these decisions. First, it has been consistently held that the second
amendment guarantees a collective right held by the states, and not an
individual right. Typical of these decisions is the Sixth Circuit's ruling
in Stevens v. United States," rejecting a challenge to the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968:
Since the Second Amendment right 'to keep and bear Arms* applies
only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the indi-
vidual's right to bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express
constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm. 2
This is consistent with the historical background of the amendment, in
that the reference to the "right of the people" appears to be merely
incidental to ihe fact that, in 1776, militiamen customarily supplied
their own weapons.
Secondly, the second amendment has been construed to limit the
federal government only and not the states. The First Circuit. in Cases
r. United States," held that any right to bear arms "depends on local
legislation: the only function of the Second Amendment being to pre-
vent the federal government, and the federal government only. from
infringing that right. 5 4
2. The State Courts
The decisions of the state courts have largely paralleled those of the
federal courts. Several opinions of the nineteenth century wax elo-
quently on the fundamental nature of the right to bear arms. In 1846.
the Georgia Supreme Court's decision to strike down a state law bar-
ring pocket pistols contained the following passage:
When, I would ask, did any legislative body in the Union have the right
to deny to its citizens the privilege of keeping and bearing arms in de-
fence of themselves and their country?
If this right. 'inestimable to freemen.' has been guaranteed no British
subjects since the abdication and flight of the last of the Stuarts and the
ascension of the Prince of Orange, did it not belong to our colonial
ancestors in this western hemisphere? Has it been a part of the English
Constitution ever since the bill of rights and act of settlement? and been
forfeited here by the substitution and adoption of our own Constitu-
tion? No notion can be more fallacious than this! On the contrary, this
is one of the fundamental principles, upon which rests the great fabric
51 440 1: 2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971).
52 Id at 149. See also Untcd States v. Johnson. 497 F.2d 548. 550 (4th Cir. 1974). United
States % Tot, 131 F.2d 261. 266 (3d Cit. 1942). rev'don other grounds. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
53 131 F.2d 916 (Ist Cit. 1942).
54 Id at 921. See also Eckert v. City of Philadelphia. 329 F. Supp. 845 t E.D. Pa.). aI'd. 477
F 2d 610 (3d Cit. 1971).
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of civil liberty, reared by the fathers of the Revolution and of the
country.5"
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court in 1859 wrote that "the people
cannot be effectually oppressed and enslaved who are not first dis-
armed."56 There the court held that the right to bear arms does not
derive from the State government. It is one of the 'high powers' dele-
gated directly to the citizen, and 'is excepted out of the general powers
of government.' A law cannot be passed to infringe upon or impair it.
because it is above the law. and independent of the lawmaking
power."
More recent decisions, however, have followed the lead of the fed-
eral courts in deciding that the second amendment provides only a col-
lective right'" and that it restricts only Congress."
In addition, the state courts have long upheld reasonable restrictions
on the right to bear arms. In Burton v. Sills,' the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted that the right at common law was far from absolute, and
restricted as far back as the Statute of Northampton in 1328. The most
common forms of regulation were, and still are, those regarding the
carrying of concealed weapons, possession by certain classes of people.
such as felons or the insane; and registration or licensing provisions.":
The picture in both federal and state court systems is the same: an
initial acceptance of the right to bear arms as a fundamental right pre-
dating the Constitution, followed by a growing reluctance to extend
constitutional protection to the right. In part, this may be due to simple
changes in social climate. In the transition from the early 1800's to the
present century, the value of the firearm as a provider of food and self-
defense has dropped considerably.
D. Are Arms Still "Fundamental"?
Even if one takes it for granted that the Framers would have consid-
ered arms "fundamental" without hesitation, the inquiry is not com-
plete. Social and technological change, along with a reluctance on the
part of the modem Supreme Court to further expand the boundaries of
55. Nunn v. State. I Ga. 243. 249 (1846).
56. Cockrem v. State. 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859).
57. Id
58. See. e.g.. Application of Cassidy. 268 A.D. 282. 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944) a f'd, 296 N.Y.
926. 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947): Photos v. Toledo. 48 Ohio Op. 2d 274. 250 N.E.2d 916 (1967).
59. See. e.g.. People v. Scale. 274 Cal. App. 2d 107. 73 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1969): Harris v. State.
83 Nev. 404. 432 P.2d 929 (1967).
60. 53 N.J. 86. 248 A.2d 521 (1968).
61. A considerable number of state cases are collected on these three areas in Annot.. 37
A L.R. Fed. 696. 718-27 (1978). See also Robertson v. Baldwin. 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) in which
the Court notes by way of dicta that the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights included with them
"certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case."
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substantive due process, will probably conspire to prevent judicial rec-
ognition of the "fundamental" nature of the right to possess arms.
The "sedentary militia" of 1776 is an idea whose time is long past.
Modern military weapons require standardized ammunition, training
and maintenance far beyond the ability of "the whole body of the peo-
ple" to provide. The Armed Forces Reserves have replaced the militia
as the primary reserve force for the defense of the United States. The
United States had fielded a standing army even before the War of 1812,
and its good behavior has shown the Framers' fears to be groundless.
Even Baron von Steuben's hated "select militia" lives today in the form
of the National Guard.
The concern for a military balance between the states and the federal
government has also become largely moot. Today both federal and
state authorities share control over the National Guard. The political
process has worked well enough to relax concern of a tyrannical gov-
ernment using its armed might to destroy liberty. 2 The hypothetical
deterrent effect of an armed populace seems a powerful and unwel-
come force to tolerate in a society which has remained fairly stable. As
Justice Frankfurter wrote in Dennis r. United States."' "'no government
can recognize a 'right' of revolution."
Yet it is possible to argue for at least a limited recognition of the
right. Arms have played an historic role in our society. in hunting and
recreation. Such material may not seem the stuff of constitutional law
but it must be borne in mind that the focus of the "fundamental rights"
analysis is whether a right is "rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people."" Considerations as nebulous as the "sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life'b1 5 have provided the foundation for the
constitutional protection of contraceptive use and abortion. Similarly,
it may well be true that the deterrent of arms has had a modern role to
play in checking police misconduct in the highly charged racial con-
frontations and mass protests against the government that have charac-
terized dissent in the past two decades.
In any event, the deciding factor will most probably be the reluc-
tance of the United States Supreme Court to continue the expansive
policies of the Warren Court. Since the 1969 decision in Shapiro V.
Thonpson," recognizing a fundamental right to interstate travel, the
Burger Court has not accorded fundamental status to any "new" rights.
Instead it has pursued a policy of guarding those recognized in earlier
62 One might cite the Civil War as an exception to this generalization.
63, 341 U.S. 494. 549 (1951) (concurring opinion).
64 Snyder v. Massachusetts. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
65 Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. at 484.
66 394 U.S 618 (1969).
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decisions such as privacy,' but has apparently "drawn the line." In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez," the Court re-
fused to accept the "right to an education" as fundamental. In that
case, Justice Powell's majority opinion struck hard at the dangers of the
substantive due process approach, warning that socially desirable goals
are not necessarily "values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into
otherwise legitimate state activities." Considering the historical role
the Court played in shaping education, through its desegregation deci-
sions, a reluctance to characterize education as fundamental suggests a
poor chance for a social issue as controversial as arms.7" In a footnote
to a recent decision upholding the 1968 Gun Control Act, the Court
even stated that "restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based on
constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitu-
tionally protected liberties.''
IV. REGULATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
In Part 11 of this article it was suggested that a prohibition of private
handgun ownership would have little difficulty clearing the hurdles of
the traditional "rational basis" scrutiny under the due process clause.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that a modern Supreme
Court were to extend "fundamental right" status to the right to bear
arms, it might still be possible to defend legislative attempts to ban
handguns. An analogy may be drawn between the second and first
amendments, in that both may be said to contain a "core content" of a
political nature which justifies a lesser degree of protection to the exer-
cise of that right outside of that scope. Thus, just as it is possible to
regulate certain categories of speech due to their minimal contribution
to the political process and their adverse effects on society, so may it be
possible to regulate certain categories of weapons through the same
considerations.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,7 2 the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the first amendment does not extend its protection over
certain types of speech: libel, obscenity and so-called "fighting
67. Perhaps the most obvious example of the Burger Court's commitment to the fundamental
rights of the Warren Court was Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S- 113 (1973). interpreting the right of privacy
to protect a woman's interest in having an abortion.
68. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
69. Id at 36. But cf. Plyler v. Doe. - U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 2382 (.1982) wherein education.
though not a fundamental right, is found to be deserving of an intermediate level of scrutiny.
70. The addition to the Court of Justice O'Connor. whose views favoring State power are
well'known. serves to increase the chances of a decision in favor of State regulation of arms. See
O'Connor. Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts From the Perspective of
a State Court Judge. 22 W,. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981).
71. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55. 65 n.8 (1980).
72. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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words." 3 Although this theory has been restricted somewhat in recent
years,"' it has largely survived intact." The rationale remains, in the
words of the Chaplinsky Court, that certain types of speech are "of such
slight social value. . . that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. "
The reference point for determining "social value" is the purpose for
which the first amendment was enacted: to guarantee free and open
discussion of social and political issues. 7
Similarly, the validity of laws which restrict the right to keep and
bear arms may be determined with reference to the "core" content of
that right, as embodied in the history of the second amendment and the
political thought of the Framers of the Constitution. That content, as
noted above, may be described as the preservation of the generalized
deterrent effect an armed populace creates against a government which
abuses its limited powers. Thus, incidents of firearms ownership which
do not contribute significantly to this goal may be regulated in view of
the increasingly serious contribution firearms, and handguns in partic-
ular, make to crime and injury.
The role of the handgun in organized military conflict, whether en
masse or in guerilla warfare, is negligible. The handgun has never
been used for more than a personal sidearm for officers and since
World War 1I has been gradually abandoned in favor of light-weight
carbines."M Its short range and low accuracy, when compared to long
guns. make it a decidedly impractical choice for any type of conven-
tional hunting. Yet it is precisely this concealability and close-range
effectiveness that make the handgun such a danger. particularly in
dense urban areas.79
Thus the central concern of the right, to provide the "deterrent ef-
fect" would be relatively unaffected by laws which would prohibit
handgun ownership but leave untouched other categories of weapons.
73. Id at 573.
74. See.e.g.. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). in which the Court held that
the first amendment protects even defamatory speech directed at public oflicial, absent ,% tdcincc
of malicious intent. Bur see Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (refusing to extend
Sullivan to defamation of private persons).
75. See Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (no first amendment protection for
obscenity).
76. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. at 572.
77. See Meiklejohn, Wat Does the First .4mendment Mean? 20 U. Cii. L. Ri:v. 461. 479
(1953).
78. G. DuNNEGAN. floW 1o MAKE WAR 27 (1982).
79. Phillips. supra note 11. at 468-74. makes the point that a higher handgun density per
capita population is significantly related to a higher incidence of aggravated assault and homiclde.
thus tending to refute the oft-repeated argument that handguns are "'just another weapon. like
knives or rocks." /d at 469. Evidently, not all of those who would assault with a gun would
assault with a rock or knife
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such as the traditional rifle and shotgun. The reasonable mind may
well balk at the prospect of our courts actively protecting the right to
maintain weapons of appropriate tactical utility. However, the "core
content" approach does offer a principled basis on which to resolve the
libertarian traditions of the Framers and the need of an evolving soci-
ety to protect itself from the criminal's hidden arsenal. The most ac-
ceptable balance may be that struck by the Georgia Supreme Court in
its 1978 decision in Carson Y. State:
It was not arbitrary or unreasonable to prohibit the keeping and carry-
ing of sawed-off shotguns. which are of a size such as can easily be
concealed and which are adapted to and commonly used for criminal
purposes. The Act does not prohibit the bearing of all arms. . . a law
is unconstitutional so far as it cuts off the exercise of the right of the
citizen altogether to bear arms.8'
SIDNEY R. BARRETT. JR.*
80 241 Ga. at 628. 247 S.E.2d at 73 (emphasis in original).
" Emory University School of Law.
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